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I Introduction
This article examines the role of 'effectiveness' within the scope of Article 83(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1 . In particular, it tries to respond to the question whether the 'essentiality' criterion in said provision can act as a check on the exercise of EU competences on the basis of the effectiveness rationale. 2 While Article 83(2) TFEU has been subject to examination by other commentators, the current academic literature
has not yet provided substantive criteria for how to interpret this provision. 3 The key point of this article is that the 'essentiality' criterion provide for one of the most important limits to the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU. In order to articulate the structure of this article, it is appropriate to restate the first part of the wording of Article 83(2) TFEU: interpretation of the 'essentiality' condition fits with the Court's existing jurisprudence.
Finally, the article summarizes the findings of the examination.
II The development of EU criminal law competences
Before entering into the analysis of Article 83(2) TFEU it is, appropriate to set out the historical background to the evolution of the EU's criminal law competence and the new provision of Article 83(2) TFEU. If we take a short departure to the history of EU criminal law, it is clear that while the EU today has a far-reaching competence in the field of EU criminal law, this was not always the case. Prior to the Environmental Crimes judgment 5 and the Lisbon Treaty, the EU only had an indirect and limited influence on national criminal laws. 6 The rationale for separating criminal law from the realm of EU competences was related to sovereignty and political sensitivity. First, given the differences in legal cultures and the different socio-ethical legal orders in the Member States, it was excessively difficult to find a common European understanding of what behaviours and offences should be subject to criminal sanctions. Secondly, if a power to impose criminal sanction were granted to a supranational organisation, this would possibly compromise the respect for the state as a sovereign entity.
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However, as the Community's substantive competences expanded and borders were opened up to ensure the free movement rights, new challenges in combating crime emerged in the form of serious transnational organised crime, such as drug trafficking, money laundering and trafficking in human beings. Such crimes needed enforcement through common action.
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Because of these threats to the Community, the Member States decided in the Maastricht
Treaty to institute a general cooperation mechanism in EU criminal law by means of the third pillar. While it was recognised that the Union had a competence to combat serious crossborder crimes on an intergovernmental level, a discussion emerged whether such a competence could also be found in the first pillar. 20 This section has shown that the criminal law competence issue has changed in character.
Instead of arguing about the conditions for establishing the competence, there is now a fierce debate on when and how this competence can be exercised. 21 The rest of the article is devoted to examine this question. Having demonstrated the importance of examining how the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU should be exercised, we move on to consider the requirement of 'effective implementation' of EU policies.
III Effective implementation of Union policies
Even though Article 83(2) TFEU presume that criminal sanctions contribute to the 'effective implementation' of Union policies, we must press further to understand this concept. A general starting point for the discussion is the general concept of 'effectiveness' in EU law. It has been suggested in the literature that 'effectiveness' implies that law matters, that it has effects on economic, political and social life outside the law. 22 It therefore includes compliance, enforcement, impact and implementation. In addition to this, we have the concept of 'effective enforcement' which is a well-known concept in EU law which has been used to describe the developments of remedies and other enforcement mechanisms under EU law. Kokott's reasoning on 'dissuasiveness' is analytically sound since it is based within the framework of the classical law and economics deterrence discourse. The law and economics approach to criminal sanctions is based on the assumption that offenders are rational calculators. If a potential perpetrator is rational, it is envisaged that such an offender will calculate the expected penalty by taking into account the probability of detection, the celerity of the sanction 26 , the probability of successful prosecution, and the severity of the potential sanction. 27 This logic assumes that crime rates can go down by either increasing severity of sanction, increasing probability of detection or by increasing celerity of the sanction. 28 If one accepts the rational choice theory, it makes sense to suggest, as Kokott does, that the effectiveness of criminal penalties will, at least partly, depend on the severity of the penalty. This section considers the meaning of the 'essentiality' condition from a linguistic, systematic, contextual and functional perspective. We commence with the linguistic perspective. The ordinary meaning of 'essentiality' in the English language suggests that 'essential' means 'without factor x result y cannot take place'. It does mean something which in the accomplishment of a given object is indispensable or an absolute necessity. 33 To take a very simple example, one can imagine a situation where a lower court shall, as a matter of procedure, consider both res judicata (i.e. law x) and litispendens (law y) to make a valid decision. 34 If anyone of these legal principles is disregarded, the judgment is not valid.
Consequently, it is 'essential' that both res judicata and litispendens are considered to make a valid decision. 
B The relationship between the 'effectiveness' criterion and the 'essentiality' criterion
Having looked at the 'linguistic' meaning of the 'essentiality' condition, the analysis continues with a systematic and principled construction of the 'essentiality' condition. First, we should consider the relationship between the 'effectiveness' criterion discussed above and the 'essentiality' requirement. It transpires that the literature generally has merged these two criteria into the principle of 'effectiveness'. The focus in the literature has been on the principle of 'effectiveness' as a rationale for expansion of EU competences and not on the 'essentiality' condition as a limit to the exercise of EU competences. criminal sanctions can only be justified on the basis of evidence showing that criminal sanctions are more deterrent than other sanctions. 49 The standard of 'relevant evidence' furthermore entails requirements both in relation to the quantity and quality of the evidence.
First, in order to prove for example the deterrent nature of criminal laws, it is necessary to refer to more than one source. If, the evidence for this claim only is sustained with reference to only one study or one scholarly article, this is insufficient. Secondly, the invoked evidence needs to be of a reliable nature which provides serious support for an argument in order to pass the test. Statistical studies, policy studies or scientific articles are examples of such evidence. The evidence for a statement on the effects of criminalization cannot thus be supported by only hearsay evidence but must be supported by either relevant literature or relevant scientific studies.
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The demand for 'relevant' evidence cannot, however, be given a too demanding interpretation. If the evidence for a legislative measure is mixed, where some evidence support the 'essentiality' of criminal laws and there is equally strong evidence supporting that non-criminal sanctions are as effective as criminal sanctions, the legality of the measure cannot be contested. One can neither require hard empirical data supporting the assertion that criminal law measures are 'essential' or that criminal sanctions have substantial effects on compliance since such data will seldom be available. Notwithstanding this, the standard of 'relevant' evidence requires a serious attempt to justify the conclusion by means of reference to empirical data in combination with adequate arguments. 51 This suggest that it is insufficient for the EU legislator to make simple assertions that 'criminal sanctions' are 'effective' and 'essential' in the enforcement of the Union policy at stake. The reasons for criminalization, whether the justifications are sought on the basis of deterrence rationale or on the basis that criminalization improves law enforcement, must be backed up by 'relevant' evidence.
D How does the proposed interpretation of the 'essentiality' condition fits with the Court's existing jurisprudence?
Having defended the importance of the 'essentiality' condition and accounted for the evidence needed to demonstrate compliance with this condition, the examination moves on to consider whether the proposed strict linguistic interpretation of the 'essentiality' requirement fit with The Court's rulings in Environmental Crimes and Ship-Source Pollution should also be taken into account in the analysis given that the principles established by these cases is assumedly guiding for how we shall understand the scope EU's criminal law competence. In this respect, it is argued that the Court's previous approach to judicial review in those cases was even more deferential than its current approach in competence and proportionality litigation. In the Environmental Crimes and the Ship-Source Pollution judgments, the Court merely accepted the Council's assessment that criminal sanctions were 'essential' in those cases for the effective implementation of Union environmental law. 55 Under the Court's judgments, it seems to be sufficient that the Union institutions consider criminal measures 'essential' for the purposes of the effectiveness of Union law, not that they prove it to be 'essential'. At least one would not envision the Court to adopt a lighter test than 'manifestly inappropriate' in a field such as criminal law which is sensitive for political reasons and fundamental rights concerns and where such concerns militate against turning the 'essentiality' condition to a political question. 59 Under the test in the Environmental Crimes judgment the Court would be unable to question the Union legislator's choice even when it appears on the face of it to be patently unreasonable. In the Court's standard case-law on proportionality and the common policies, the Court would at least be able to perform this Secondly, more serious judicial enquiry of legislation adopted under Article 83(2) TFEU is also justified because of the 'essentiality' requirement's appeal to the principle of ultima ratio. 66 This principle demands that criminal law is only used in situations of necessity, when something needs to be done because there has been a serious infringement of the interests of society and only when it has been established empirically that other less coercive measures are insufficient. 67 The Commission itself has also recognized that the ultima ratio principle should be a guiding principle for the EU legislator when it exercises the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU. 68 If the Court would, as I argue, apply the 'essentiality' condition in the light of the ultima ratio principle, we can expect strict review of EU criminal law legislation and that the Court abandons its current feeble application of the 'manifestly inappropriate' standard for broad EU policies. 69 Thirdly, from a contextual perspective, a more searching judicial enquiry is furthermore supported by the political statements of the Union institutions which acknowledge the need to take the 'essentiality' requirement seriously. Both the Parliament and the Commission have underlined that the 'essentiality criterion' implicates a need to analyse thoroughly in the impact assessment preceding any legislative proposal whether measures other than criminal law measures could not sufficiently ensure the policy implementation. 70 Having argued for intense review of the 'essentiality' requirement, it is now appropriate to discuss in more detail the standard for judicial review and test for legality that should be adopted by the Court. Whilst the Court, from a comparative institutional perspective, 71 may be ill-equipped to reassess factual evidence and the policy choices involved in designing criminal law legislation, there is a solution to the problem of making judicial review of the 'essentiality' condition effective. The suggestion here is that the Court should employ a procedural review enquiry to check for compliance under Article 83(2) TFEU. Procedural review of the 'essentiality' condition allows the Court to control compliance with the 'essentiality' condition without intruding upon the Union legislator's margin of appreciation to the appropriateness of a criminal law measure. 72 Procedural review also facilitates the judicial task since the Court with adequate reasoning and evidence from the EU legislative institutions will be able to properly review whether the 'essentiality' condition has been adhered to. 73 The suggested standard for legality implies a test of checking firstly whether there is 'adequate' reasoning for the measure's compliance with the 'essentiality' requirement and secondly whether the evidence is 'relevant' to substantiate conformity with said condition. 74 On the basis of the Court's ruling in Kadi II and Tetra Laval I suggest a test where the EU legislator first must articulate, at least one justification, which in theory is sufficient as basis for sustaining compliance with the 'essentiality' condition exercising the competence. The benchmark to examine whether the justifications are 'adequate' is the relevant criminal law and criminological literature. If the proposed justifications are considered adequate, the second limb of the test considers whether these justifications are supported by 'relevant' evidence. 75 As suggested above, this evidence needs to be of certain quantity and quality to substantiate the rationale for exercising the competence under Article 83(2) TFEU. 76 This test for legality provides for more intensity than what follows from the Court's current low-level intensity mode of review which is normally applied in terms of judicial review of broad Union policy measures. The proposed test does, contrary to the Court's approach in Swedish Match 77 , not accept mere reference to preambles as justification for legislation but requires references to evidence in legislative background documents such as impact assessments and explanatory memorandums. The Court must also consider, in contrast to cases such as Vodafone 78 and Alliance Health 79 , whether the evidence is 'relevant' and fits to the rationale for exercising the competence in Article 83(2) TFEU. 80 The central distinction from the Court's current approach to judicial review of EU legislation is that my proposal asks the Court to be more intrusive when considering whether the necessary facts have been taken into account before exonerating the EU legislator. 81 It is envisaged that if the EU legislator is not able to provide for, at least, one theoretically compelling justification to defend compliance with the 'essentiality' condition or if the proposed justification is not defended by 'sufficient'
and 'relevant' evidence, the Court should invalidate the proposed criminal law measure.
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V CONCLUSION
This article set out to consider whether the 'essentiality' condition in Article 83(2) can limit excessive EU harmonization of criminal laws on the basis of the 'effectiveness' rationale.
The article examined two different themes.
The first theme concerned the interpretation of the 'essentiality' condition and the condition of 'effective implementation of EU policies'. I endorsed the law and economics approach to criminal sanctions and suggested that the effectiveness of criminal law is a matter of compliance. I suggested a two part test for demonstrating compliance with the 'essentiality' condition. First, the Union legislator must show by empirical evidence that criminal laws are 'effective' for the implementation of Union policies. Secondly, the EU legislator must demonstrate through such evidence that criminal sanctions are more 'effective' than noncriminal sanctions in the implementation' of a specific Union policy. I also clarified the relationship between distinction between the essentiality condition and the effectiveness principle. The 'effectiveness' principle is a different rule than the 'essentiality' condition.
Whilst the 'effectiveness' test is a simple one of establishing whether criminal laws in any way contribute positively to the implementation of EU policies, the 'essentiality' test examines whether criminal laws are more effective than non-criminal laws in enforcing the EU policy at issue in terms of dissuasion and achievement of the objectives of the EU policy at issue. Because the 'essentiality' condition not only encompassed a demand to show the effectiveness of criminal laws but a requirement to show criminal laws' prominence over noncriminal sanctions, I maintained that the 'essentiality' condition is a serious check on EU criminal law harmonization under Article 83(2) TFEU.
The second leitmotif of the article was judicial enforcement of the 'essentiality' condition.
The enquiry used legal, moral, political and criminological arguments to challenge the rationale of the exercise of EU criminal law competences and to develop a test for judicial review. First, the 'light touch' approach in the Environmental Crimes Case to review of the 'essentiality' condition was rejected as unfounded since it was inconsistent with the Court's previous case-law on review of broad Union policies and because such a standard of review would de facto would bar the Court from reviewing criminal law measures and entail unacceptable moral costs. Secondly, it was argued that the Court's current low intensity application of the 'manifestly inappropriate' standard in the field of broad EU policies was inadequate to ensure proper judicial scrutiny of EU legislation under Article 83(2) TFEU.
Given that criminal sanctions are associated with harsh consequences for individuals, given that the 'essentiality' requirement appeals to the ultima ratio principle and given that the Union institutions has officially emphasised that the 'essentiality' criterion must be strictly applied, there was a need for a more comprehensive test than the 'manifestly inappropriate' standard of review. 
